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Abstract
In 1974, President Ford began the arduous task of healing the wounds sustained by the United
States during the Vietnam War. His controversial clemency plan gave those who had either
deserted the military or those who evaded the draft the chance to earn their way back into
American society. President Ford was willing to face this opposition to move the country closer
to resolving an issue that was tearing the nation apart. In the applications to Ford’s Presidential
Clemency Board, thousands of deserters and evaders reveal their motivations, and in doing so
present a large body of evidence that contradicts the usual perception of the Vietnam “draftdodger” and deserter. In the transition between the hardline anti-clemency position of President
Nixon, and the full clemency position of President Carter, Ford took strong measures to achieve
resolution, and the evidence herein could suggest a reappraisal of the Ford presidency.

Keywords: President Gerald Ford, Clemency, Vietnam, Draft Evaders, Deserters, President
Ford’s Clemency Board
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Introduction
In Article II, Section 2, of the United States Constitution, the President of the United States is
granted the power to issue pardons.1 At least one third of America’s commanders-in-chief have
utilized these powers either by granting pardons or by granting amnesty.2 Pardon and amnesty
are often used interchangeably, but they do not share the same meaning. A pardon, as mentioned
in the Constitution, usually favors one person or a small group of offenders. Amnesty, which is
not mentioned in the Constitution, falls under the blanket of pardoning power and usually favors
a large group of people. There are two types of amnesty: absolute and conditional. An absolute
pardon is forgiveness without penalty and a conditional pardon has conditions that must be met.
Both pardons and amnesties have been granted from President George Washington to the present
day.3
In 1974, after taking office, one of President Gerald R. Ford’s first goals was to heal the
divided United States. However, he was unsure of what steps to take to start the slow process of
healing after a long, unpopular war and the Watergate Scandal that had resulted in his
presidency. Secretary James R. Schlesinger suggested he “do something about the fifty thousand
draft evaders and deserters.”4 Both Presidents Lincoln and Truman had used their presidential
pardon power to heal divides in the country after the Civil War and World War II. The programs
of these two presidents would become blueprints for The President Ford Clemency Program.
President Ford knew that his program would be met with resistance from a large sector of the
American public. He looked first to the pardon strategy of President Lincoln, who was also met
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by resistance. In his autobiography, A Time to Heal, President Ford wrote that Lincoln was
“criticized for being too lenient, but his was probably the right decision at the time.”5 The Ford
Clemency Program would echo Lincoln’s program and his reasons for pardoning.
On December 8, 1863, President Abraham Lincoln issued a “Declaration of Amnesty and
Reconstruction.”6 In this document, Lincoln offered conditional pardons to those who had
participated in the southern rebellion, with the exception of members of the Confederate
government and those who had served as officers above the paygrade of colonel in the
Confederate military. A condition of the pardon was that everyone who chose to take advantage
would have to take an oath of allegiance to the United States and uphold it to the best of their
abilities Lincoln, in an effort to assuage criticism about his amnesty policy, made two points. The
first was making it clear that it was within his rights under the Constitution to implement this
policy. Second, he emphasized that no one would be forced to affirm loyalty to the Union.7
Many of the circumstances faced by Lincoln in 1863 would be echoed in 1974 with the
implementation of the Ford Clemency Program. Lincoln and Ford would both face mixed
reactions toward their programs and both programs would prove to be difficult to administer.8
President Lincoln’s program was based upon a conditional amnesty policy, and Ford could relate
to and take pointers from Lincoln. However, it would be President Truman’s Amnesty Board that
would more closely serve as a general template for the Ford Clemency Board.
On December 23, 1946, soon after the end of World War II, Truman announced Executive
Order 9814. This order created a three-person board to review the cases of people who had been
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convicted of violating the Selective Service Act of 1940. This board would function in a threestep process. In the first step, the board would review the case and determine whether or not to
make a determination for executive clemency. Then the findings would be sent to the United
States Attorney General who would review the case and make a final recommendation to
President Truman. Finally, the president would take all evidence into account and make the final
decision on whether clemency would be approved or denied.9
Truman’s Executive Order was a victory for many conscientious objectors and their
supporters. A sizable number of men had chosen not to fight in World War II. According to
Andrew Dunar, from October 16, 1940 to July 1, 1945 there were 13,986 convictions for
violations of the Selective Service Act.10 Out of those convicted, 5,516 claimed religious or
conscientious objector status.11 By 1945, organizations such as the War Resisters League and the
Committee for Amnesty began bringing organization to the movement for complete amnesty. 12
With the growing call for amnesty, Truman begrudgingly announced the model of his
amnesty board. By December of 1947, 3,041 people had been granted executive amnesty.13
President Truman’s Amnesty Board became the foundation for the Ford Clemency Board;
however, many changes had to be made in order for it to work in the post-Vietnam era. In a 1972
letter from Thomas M. Susman, the Chief Counsel of the Subcommittee on Administrative
Practice and Procedure, to Senator Edward Kennedy, Susman points out some of the
shortcomings of Truman’s Board. He mentions that one of the biggest issues with Truman’s
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Board was the narrow scope of the cases that were reviewed. Truman’s amnesty board almost
exclusively looked at cases involving conscientious objectors, whereas Ford’s Board was also
going to be looking at the cases of deserters, expatriates, and domestic fugitives.14 Chief Counsel
Susman sums up his analysis by saying many soldiers in previous American conflicts were
sincere in why they chose not to serve. He ends his letter by asking “Are they, and future refusers
in some popular war, to be denied amnesty for equally deeply held beliefs with little or no
distinction beyond the fact that the majority thinks their ideas are wrong?”15
Both the Lincoln and Truman models would have to be altered to fit the realities of the
Vietnam era. Despite the difficulties and objections to clemency by a substantial number of the
American public, Ford persisted with his goal to heal the nation. The result would be a program
that was perhaps flawed but also provided a way of healing to many evaders, deserters, and their
families. In the postwar period, Ford’s program would result in thousands applying and receiving
clemency discharges. This thesis will use a sample of the almost 22,000 applications to Ford’s
Presidential Clemency Board to argue that the applications produced by the program reveal a
much more complicated set of reasons than have previously been revealed and for this reason
alone, Gerald Ford’s Clemency Program, though flawed in many ways, can be considered a
success. It will also show that in the transition between the hardline anti-clemency position of
President Nixon and the full clemency position of President Carter, Ford took strong measures to
achieve resolution, and the evidence could suggest a reappraisal of the Ford Presidency.
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Historiography
The Presidential Clemency Program was arguably one of the defining moments of President
Ford’s administration. Despite the subject’s importance, historians have largely ignored the
subject. Even Ford barely mentions the program in his autobiography. In A Time to Heal; The
Autobiography of Gerald Ford, he only devotes five paragraphs to the program. Douglas
Brinkley follows this same pattern in his book Gerald Ford. He briefly mentions the program,
but mostly in conjunction with the former Nixon administration.16 John Robert Greene, in The
Presidency of Gerald R. Ford, mentions the program in the most detail.17 In four pages in his
book, he provides a brief description of the program, as well as the final statistics. However, he
argues that the program was a “well-run and dutiful commission, the PCB was true to Ford’s
promise of ‘earned reentry’ for draft evaders.”18
William A. Strauss and Lawrence M. Baskir disagree with Greene’s interpretation of a wellrun program. In their first book, Reconciliation after Vietnam: a Program of Relief for Vietnamera Draft and Military Offenders, both authors argue that the program could be considered a
failure.19 They stated “The Clemency Program had such major defects in design and
administration that the low numbers [of participants] reflect more on it than on the people it
purported to help.”20 They used their book to both point out the Ford program’s flaws and
suggest improvements for a new program to help draft deserters and draft evaders. In Strauss and
Baskir’s second book, Chance and Circumstance of The Vietnam Generation, the authors created
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a portrait of the young people of the Vietnam era.21 Instead of writing about those who fought,
they wrote about those who did not fight. They state the purpose of the book is to “show who
they were and how they escaped the war—and yet, did not escape it.”22 Both books by Strauss
and Baskir are useful resources and provide the backbone for almost every succeeding study of
the Ford Clemency Program.
Joshua Dunton uses Strauss and Baskir throughout his thesis, “To Heal the Nation: the
Creation of President Ford’s Clemency Program.”23 Dunton argues that the clemency board’s
creation was influenced by many different factors including “the offenders themselves, the
amnesty debate, including its coverage in the news media and the symbolic nature of the debate,
public opinion and President Ford’s personal and political influences.”24 His is an interesting
thesis; however, his lack of primary sources decreases the validity of his argument. He uses
Baskir and Strauss in place of primary research regarding the statistics of who applied and the
final numbers of the program. The problem with using these numbers is addressed by Strauss and
Baskir in the preface of Reconciliation after Vietnam. The authors state they “must caution the
reader not to interpret our statistics as precise measures of the scope of the issue. Although we
have presented the best available amnesty data in this report, almost none of the statistics can be
established with certainty.”25 Dunton also argues that the “draft offenders were a diverse group
that chose to defy the Selective Service System in an attempt to avoid military service in
Vietnam.”26
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Announcement of the Clemency Program
In August of 1974, after President Ford had decided that he would grant conditional amnesty
to draft evaders and deserters, a discussion began as to where he should announce his plan. This
topic was debated among Ford; Jack Marsh, who served as an advisor to the president;
Alexander Haig, the Chief of Staff; and Phillip Buchen and Robert Hartmann, who both served
as White House counselors.27 The easy route would be to reveal his plan to an audience that
would support his decision. Instead, Ford chose the annual Veterans of Foreign Wars (VFW)
Conference on August 19. According to Ford, he believed that announcing the plan in front of
this audience would “indicate strength on my part.”28 In her diary, Betty Ford wrote that the
morning that they headed to the VFW convention, the President knew the veterans would not be
supportive of the plan. However, he told his wife that “it would have been a little cowardice, I
think, if I’d picked an audience that was ecstatic. You can’t talk about healing unless you are
going to use it in the broadest context.”29
The text of Ford’s speech was not included in the information sent to the conference ahead of
time, and the reporters who flew with the president to Chicago were also not told about Ford’s
announcement. According to Ford, this was done to curtail any demonstrations that may have
occurred.30 He began his announcement to the veterans by reaffirming that he was against
blanket amnesty for those who were considered draft dodgers. However, he also acknowledged
that “like President Truman and President Lincoln before me,, I found on my desk, where the
buck stops, the urgent problem of how to bind the nations wounds. And I aim to do that.”31 He
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then told the crowd of veterans that he had given Secretary of Defense Schlesinger and Attorney
General William Saxbe until September 1 to compile a report of those who had been charged
with draft evasion. Ford did not villainize those who had chosen not serve. In contrast he said
that they could be considered “casualties, still abroad and absent without leave from the real
America.”32
Ford finished his announcement by saying, “I am throwing the weight of the Presidency into
the scales of justice on the side of leniency. I foresee their earned reentry—earned reentry-into a
new atmosphere of hope, hard work, and mutual trust.”33 During the speech a wave of silence
fell over the crowd of veterans. It came as a great shock that the president had changed the policy
of his predecessor, Richard Nixon, who had been vehemently against amnesty. The next day, on
August 20, 1974, the VFW responded to the amnesty plan by passing two resolutions. The first
motion reaffirmed the organization’s long-held position to oppose any kind of amnesty. The
second resolution was to stand strong in their position and to oppose amnesty publicly.34
The Veterans of Foreign Wars may have taken an immediate, firm stance against amnesty.
However, the rest of the country was less sure on where it stood. The Vietnam War had divided
the country and as a result revealed the differences between the Vietnam and World War II
generations. In The Warrior Image: Soldiers in American Culture from the Second World War to
the Vietnam Era, Andrew J. Huebner argues that the Vietnam War killed the image of the heroic
World War II soldier. The image of the valiant World War II soldier was replaced by the
Vietnam soldier, a man who needed to be pitied and commiserated.35 Many of the old guard
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viewed those who deserted during the Vietnam War as being cowards. However, there were only
twenty-four men convicted of battlefield desertion during the Vietnam era compared to the
20,000 men who were convicted during World War II.36
Many newspapers around the country began polling readers, many of them citizens who had
never served in the military, asking how they felt about the Ford announcement. The Greenville
News poll of the residents of Greenville, South Carolina, illustrated these mixed feelings. The
responses were varied and diverse. Sam Baston disagreed with blanket amnesty but thought that
“they should be brought back into our society but should have to pay in some way for their
desertion.”37 Within the same article, Aldean Howard was quoted in saying “I don’t approve of
the President’s action. If they had loved their country they wouldn’t have deserted in the first
place.”38 Then there were some people like Kim Jones, who advocated for total amnesty and told
the reporter that “they should be put back free on the streets because they refused to fight a war
that was never declared.”39 This mixed sentiment was felt all over the country. So in 1974, as the
country was disagreeing on whether amnesty should be considered for draft evaders, Secretary of
Defense Schlesinger and Attorney General William B. Saxbe were already researching how the
amnesty board would work.
Schlesinger and Saxbe’s report reached Ford’s desk on August 30, 1974. The report was
divided into three parts: a numerical breakdown of draft evaders and deserters, the country’s
opinion on amnesty, and a proposed program. Part one, the numerical section, was broken into
two categories. The first category included the 8,700 men who had been convicted of violating
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the Selective Service Act. The second group was comprised of 6,100 men who were under
investigation for violating the act. As of August 1974, 15,500 evaders were potentially eligible
for the Clemency Program.40 In the next section, the term deserter was defined as anyone absent
from the U.S. military for 30 or more days without proper authorization. During the war,
approximately 500,000 incidents of desertion were recorded and processed through the military
system. However, Schlesinger and Saxbe found around 12,500 deserters were at large in the
United States and around 1,500 deserters were living in Canada.41 Those who had deserted to
countries in Europe, most notably Sweden, were not included in the report. This might be
because countries such as Sweden and Canada did not keep accurate counts of those who came
into their country. Canada, for example, did not distinguish between fugitives and evaders.42
Schlesinger and Saxbe also determined that “a profile of the typical deserter indicated that he
was an enlistee, a non-high school graduate, was from 18-21 years old, was single, and was in
one of the four lowest enlisted pay grades.43
The second part of the report analyzed the American public’s view on amnesty. Saxby and
Schlesinger found that many people were in favor of some sort of amnesty. Within that group, it
was found that most supported the idea of a conditional amnesty. This attitude was mirrored in
the U.S. Congress.44 This part concluded that amnesty had its objectors; however, most
Americans seemed to be in favor of beginning to bring the country back together with the
condition that there would be consequences for the deserters and evaders.

40
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The third part of the report contained a proposed plan for a reconciliation program, which
was broken down into two sections. The first section applied to the individuals who were either
“at-large” or who were under investigation. The men who fell into this category would not be
prosecuted for their offenses if they agreed to do alternative service. The amount of leniency in
the program was based on several factors that the board would have to determine:
(1) whether to indict a returning evader; (2) the type of discharge received by a returning
deserter; (3) the nature and length of the commitment to perform alternative service, the
degree of latitude in the type of alternative service, and the degree to which this performance
will be monitored and enforced; (4) the nature, if any, of a reaffirmation of allegiance,
including acknowledgment of absence; and (5) the degree of exoneration which will be
afforded upon successful completion of a period of alternate service.45
The list of variables could also be added to, based on the applicant. Those who were accepted
into the program would have to take an oath of allegiance to the country and would be required
to perform alternative service for a maximum of eighteen months.46
The second section involved the time aspect of the program. Schlesinger and Saxbe
determined that the new program should accept applications for 120 days. They also
recommended that the participants of the program could only apply if their convictions fell
between August 4, 1964 (Tonkin Gulf Resolution) and March 28, 1973 (the day all American
troops were withdrawn). This plan evolved as the program developed. However, the basis of
President Ford’s Clemency Board would owe its structure to Saxby and Schlesinger.
The Charge of the Clemency Board
On September 8, 1974, in a speech given at the White House, President Ford signed a
proclamation and two executive orders that put his Clemency Board into action. Executive Order
11803 established the clemency board, and Executive Order 11804 gave Director of Selective
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Service the power to help with finding alternative service opportunities for applicants. In his
speech, Ford once again declared the goal of the Clemency Program was “the reconciliation of
all our people and the restoration of the essential unity of Americans within which honest
differences of opinion do not descend to angry discord and mutual problems are not polarized by
excessive passion.”47 Despite the popularity of the amnesty decision in America, this passion w
reflected in the editorial pages of newspapers across the country. In The Philadelphia Inquirer,
H.W. Fullerton, a VFW member and veteran, wrote to the editor that “to take the side of gutless
cowards who would rather run than serve is as low as you can get.”48
Before signing Executive Order 11803, President Ford proclaimed in his speech that all
deserters and draft evaders were eligible to apply to the program regardless of whether the
applicant had been convicted or not. The applicants who had been convicted of violating the
Selective Service Act of 1940 would have their cases referred to a nine-person clemency board.
Those applicants who were not in the process of being convicted would have their sentences
commuted and be given twenty-four months of alternative service.49 This length of time could be
altered based upon circumstances of the applicant’s offense. In some cases, men would have
their cases upgraded to a general discharge and the AWOLs would be ignored.
The nine-person clemency board included people from various walks of life including retired
military, attorneys, and former and current representatives of various government boards. The
representatives from the military included Gen. Lewis W. Walt, James Dougovita, and Dr. Ralph
Adams. The military group comprised both the youngest and the oldest members of the board.
“President Gerald R. Ford’s Remarks Announcing a Program for the Return of Vietnam Era Draft
Evaders and Military Deserters,” September 16, 1974, Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library,
https://www.fordlibrarymuseum.gov/library/speeches/740077.asp.
48
The Philadelphia Inquirer, September 3, 1974.
49
“President Gerald R. Ford’s Remarks Announcing a Program,” September 16, 1974, Gerald R. Ford
Library.
47
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General Walt, a retired 61-year-old U.S. Marine, brought 34 years of military experience to the
board. He was awarded many accolades over his long career, including the Navy Cross and
numerous Purple Hearts. James Dougovita, the youngest on the board at 28, was a Vietnam
veteran and a captain in the Michigan National Guard. After serving in Vietnam and earning
many accolades, he worked with minority students at Michigan Tech as a teacher’s aide. Another
member of the clemency board who intermingled education and a military career was Dr. Ralph
Adams, the 59-year-old president of Troy State University. He also had a law degree and served
as a Brigadier General in the Alabama Air National Guard.50
In 1974, five of the nine members of the board had law degrees; however only three were
currently practicing law. The practicing attorneys included the Honorable Robert H. Finch, a 52year-old practicing lawyer and the former Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW)
who had also served as a White House counselor under President Nixon. Aida Casanas
O’Connor, an attorney and the assistant counsel to the New York State Division of Housing and
Community Renewal in New York City, served as the only woman on the board as well as being
the only Hispanic representative. The other practicing attorney on the board was Charles E.
Goodell, chairman of the Presidential Clemency Board. At 48 years old, the former New York
senator had been an outspoken critic of the Vietnam War. His anti-war views earned him
criticism from the Nixon administration.51 When announcing the board, Ford told members of
his cabinet that hiring Goodell “would be controversial, but I think he will do a good job.”52
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The final three members of the board were either current or former members of national
organizations. Father Theodore Hesburg, president of the University of Notre Dame, had served
both as the chair of the U.S. Civil Rights Commission and a member of the All-Volunteer Armed
Force Committee. Vernon E. Jordan was the only African American member of the board. At 39
years old, Jordan was the Executive Director of the National Urban League and served in many
other directorial positions. The final person on the board was James Mave; in 1974, he was the
Executive Director of Paralyzed Veterans of America.53
The Public’s Response
After Ford’s announcement to the public of his Clemency Program, newspapers across the
country picked up the story. The letters to the editor of these papers soon followed, displaying
the public’s reaction to the news. It soon became evident that Americans were still divided on the
issue. A good example of this divisiveness can be found in the September 21, 1974, issue of the
Tampa Bay Times, in letters from two veterans of the World Wars. Letter writer Henry Wohnsen,
a veteran of World War II, was in favor of leniency toward those who evaded service. After
mentioning his own honorable service, he said, “This last Vietnam mess was a disgrace and I
would have had the courage to tell Uncle Sam to go to hell and try to find me.”54 This position
was countered bdisputed by Harry E. Gibson, a veteran of World War I, who hoped that he did
not live to see the day when he would “see a bunch of shirt tails going over the horizon.”55
The veterans of the World Wars were not the only group conflicted about whether or not
deserters and evaders should be given amnesty. Vietnam veterans also debated the topic within
the nation’s newspaper editorial section. John T. Hader Jr., a veteran who had spent seven
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months in a military hospital, was one of many veterans who considered deserters and evaders to
be cowards. In his letter to The Daily Inter Lake of Kalispell, Montana, Hader wrote, “It is a sad
day in American history when a coward is made welcome and our great country is not worth
defending. For his own safety I hope I never meet such a coward face-to-face.”56 Across the
country, in Rhode Island, Mike Harris shared that sentiment. Harris, an infantry veteran, wrote
that he did not believe the draft evaders and deserters should be let back into the country. In his
letter to The Daily Herald, he wrote to the editor that for him “The draft dodgers and deserters
are another caliber of people that our country is better off without. If they feel they can’t serve
their own country they shouldn’t live in it.”57
Although this sentiment was featured in many newspapers across the country some proamnesty Vietnam veterans expressed their views as well. Emil G. Best, a Vietnam veteran from
Chicago working in the pro-amnesty movement, believed the politicians were at fault instead of
the deserters and resisters. He believed the resisters should be commended, because their actions
had forced the public to face what was happening in Vietnam. In Best’s letter to the editor of the
Chicago Tribune, he wrote that it was “an open secret that our participation in Vietnam was
based on massive, unscrupulous deceit by L.B.J., Nixon, the joint chiefs, and their henchmen.
They orchestrated this disaster and let it go on and on, year after year.”58 Not all pro-amnesty
veterans blamed the government in their letters. Letter writers such as Kenneth R. Hays from San
Mateo, California, took a religious approach. Hays, a veteran who served a year and a half in
Vietnam felt that those who resisted or deserted were following the commandment that says
“Thou shalt not kill.” He praised the resisters and believed that “All they ever did was to express
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the love for their fellow man and refuse to take part in their brother’s murder, for this is
wrong.”59
Individual veterans may have been divided on what should become of the draft resisters and
evaders, but many organized veterans’ groups across the country made it clear that they were
opposed to amnesty. Members of the Veterans of Foreign Wars (VFW) wrote many letters to the
editor voicing their anti-amnesty opinion. This attitude was foreshadowed in the chilly reception
to Ford’s speech on amnesty. In 1974, after Ford officially announced the creation of the
clemency board, members of the V.F.W. once again took their opinions to print. Doane Yeager,
a veteran who signed his letter as the Department of Arkansas V.F.W. Americanism Chairman,
expressed his disdain for amnesty to the editor of the Northwest Arkansas Times. He asked if
someone would explain to him “how granting amnesty of any kind to a bunch of hippie, drop-out
traitors is going to pull this country together?”60 Yeager believed that more resources should
have been funneled to the families of those soldiers who were missing in action (M.I.A). Many
letter writers who were anti-amnesty also expressed that the Ford administration should have
focused on those who were MIA or prisoners of war before worrying about draft dodgers.
A letter writer from Troy, New York, was another member of the VFW who opposed
amnesty. An infantryman during World War II, after serving over five years in the military, had
received an honorable discharge, he believed, like many, that giving amnesty to those who
resisted or deserted would set a precedent for future wars. In his letter to The Times Record he
stated “I will accept these traitors back into this country provided they serve two nice, safe years
in poverty paying jobs and have no citizen’s rights.”61 The VFW was not the only organization
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opposed to amnesty. The Disabled American Veterans (DAV) of Nevada were opposed to the
idea of draft dodgers and resisters being given priority over disabled veterans in the job market.
In a statement to the Reno Gazette-Journal, Larry R. Thorpe, the national service officer for the
DAV office in Reno, Nevada, wanted written assurances that “evaders and deserters will not
have preference over other veterans after they have served the one or two-year alternate service
period.”62
Across the country, those who had not served in the military showed both positive and
negative reactions to the idea of a Clemency Program. The majority of these letters seemed in
favor of moving forward with Ford’s plan to heal the nation’s wounds. An example of this
opinion can be found in the September 21, 1974, edition of the Detroit Free Press. In this issue,
of nine letters related to the clemency board, seven either approved of Ford’s plan or proposed
some other kind of alternative service. Many compared the Clemency Program to the pardon of
Richard Nixon. For example, Ronald C. Hoffman believed war resisters should be given
unconditional amnesty. In his letter to the editor he said, “I think it is grossly unjust that resisters
receive only conditional amnesty when former President Richard Nixon has received full and
unconditional amnesty for his high crimes against democracy.”63 This comparison of the Nixon
pardon to the Clemency Program would appear in the majority of public opinion pieces about the
program. On September 23, 1976, Jimmy Carter defined this unfairness as the difference
between white collar and blue collar crime. During a presidential debate with Ford, Carter argued
that those who were influential and had money such as Nixon were seldom punished, however,
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those with little influence and who had less money such as deserters and resisters were almost
always punished.64
Although editorials such as Hoffman’s show that many were supportive of some sort of
amnesty program for draft resisters or evaders, it is clear that division on the issue existed. In one
extreme example, Robert J. Knodell wrote the Chicago Tribune that “unless we accept surrender
to Communist domination, we should place patriotism before humanitarianism and refuse
amnesty to draft resisters.”65 The view that granting amnesty would lead America to communism
was not a popular one. However, like Knodell, many opponents of the amnesty plan put
patriotism at the core of their arguments. In the September 8, 1974, edition of The Orlando
Sentinel, Gene C. Mullen wrote that granting amnesty to those who deserted or resisted the draft
dishonored those who lost their lives in Vietnam. Mullen asked the editor, “Why dishonor those
young men who died by granting amnesty to those who let them die?”66
Another way people chose to voice their opinions about the Clemency Program was through
letters written directly to President Ford and Charles Goodell. These, like the letters to
newspapers, were varied in content and reasons for either supporting or not supporting clemency.
Like in the newspapers, most of the letters were at the extremes of the spectrum, either strongly
opposing to any form of amnesty or only accepting blanket amnesty. Another similarity between
the letters to the newspapers and the letters directly sent to the administration was the mention of
patriotism. In many of these letters, the writers implied that a person could not be patriotic if he
evaded the draft or deserted. An example of this opinion is a letter to Ford from George D.
Conrad, who had served as a soldier during World War II. He believed that any who wanted to
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resist the war should have done it through proper channels. This process, he believed, should
have included a hearing in front of the individual’s draft board and in the case of an unfavorable
judgment, it could be appealed. Conrad believed that those who chose to leave the service rather
than go through proper channels were “contemptible cowards who were willing to let someone
else suffer or die in their place.”67 During the Vietnam War, he had visited Canada and witnessed
a group of resisters. In his letter, he described those he saw as “dirty hippies who were
completely lacking in patriotism.”68
Conrad was not the only anti-clemency veteran who wrote to the president. A very persistent
retired U.S. Army lieutenant colonel questioned the effects of clemency on future wars. Lt. Col.
James J. Mullen wrote four letters to President Ford regarding the program over the course of a
year. On September 24, 1974, he sent his first letter to the president asking eight questions to
which he asked for a “detailed reply.”69 In the first half of the letter he posed questions that
pertained to the cost and possible results of the program. The second half of the letter deviated
into questions such as “if we allow people to hide and then, when danger is past, to be accepted
and forgiven, what will happen to the sense of civic duty and responsibility next time?”70 His
questions slowly devolve from reasonable questions to direct criticism of the president. This
criticism is best displayed when he asked if the president if he “was aware that he may be
underwriting the disaster of our nation?”71 Mullen argued in his letters that most conservative
military members would be opposed to the clemency board. This opinion is evident in the direct
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letters, in the letters to the editors, and in the response of the Veterans of Foreign Wars after the
initial announcement by President Ford.
President Ford and Goodell were probably not surprised by backlash from the conservative
military. At the same time, civilians such as Carol Bernstien- Ferry and W.H. Ferry wrote to
Goodell and implored him to reassure the president that despite the backlash that he was sure to
receive from the members of the military, “there is a large, compassionate body of citizens who
look forward to a true amnesty as another refreshing breeze of post-Watergate air.”72 However,
private citizens who were not former military also wrote in to express their disapproval of the
clemency board. Barbara Tharp claimed in her letter that the Clemency Program was a waste of
money and the idea must be upsetting to those who had risked everything to serve their country.
She believed it was “disgusting that this government is sinking so low as to even consider
clemency for even one of these persons.”73 Tharp represented a very small minority of letter
writers who mentioned anything about deserters being included in the Clemency Program. Most
of the letters and the newspaper articles focused on the draft resisters. According to Tharp, it was
important to remember that it had only been a couple of decades since desertion had been
punishable by death.74
Two categories of letters comprised those who were pro-amnesty. The first group supported
the concept of the clemency board; however, the letter writers thought it should be modified.
Charles A. Miller sent a letter to Goodell proposing a way that amnesty might be granted while
working within the Clemency Board parameters. He suggested that all conscientious objectors be
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granted amnesty without having to perform alternative service. Miller argued that many
Americans realized that the Vietnam War was “immoral and unconstitutional.”75 Therefore, why
should young Americans be punished for realizing it sooner and choosing not to participate? By
not punishing the objectors, Miller wrote, the nation’s wounds would heal faster and families
could be reunited.76
The second group of pro-amnesty letter writers were supportive of clemency, but only in the
form of complete, blanket amnesty. Emil M. Deutsch’s letter agreed with Miller, that the
resisters had realized the immorality of the Vietnam War sooner than everyone else and should
not be punished. In his letter, Deutsch asked “whether it was wise to punish those who, at least in
their majority, recognized this earlier than the civilians, largely untouched by the war, by the
heavy requirements the executive order places upon them as condition for their reentry into the
U.S. society.”77 In his letter, George Hallelt agreed with this perspective and was concerned that
without amnesty, many who left the country would not return. He believed this was unacceptable
considering “their only crime was to refuse to kill or risk being killed in a war, not declared by
Congress, which was widely detested as unnecessary and unjust.”78 This support of general
amnesty was also shared by most of the clergy and clerical organizations in the country.
During the 1970s, the religious organizations in the country were largely in favor of general
amnesty. One of these organizations was Clergy and Laity Concerned (CALC). This
organization, founded in 1965, was dedicated to using a biblical worldview to advocate for peace
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in Vietnam as well as in other international and domestic issues.79 CALC issued a statement
calling for both unconditional amnesty and for Goodell’s immediate resignation. Goodell had
been a staunch antiwar senator, and his involvement with the clemency board seemed as a
betrayal. As in many other letters and articles, the organization felt President Ford held
contradictory beliefs when it came to amnesty. He had granted a general pardon to President
Nixon, even though Nixon had committed a serious crime, and yet draft resisters and deserters
were going to be punished for not participating in an immoral conflict.80 The organization also
criticized Charles Goodell, who had been an anti-war activist. According to a statement from the
organization, Goodell should “stand with the men you led away from war, not against them.
Demand an end to punitive services, trials, and all vindictive measures. Close down the
Clemency Board with a statement of true amnesty.”81 The organization closed its statement by
declaring that the amnesty program would not bind the nations wounds. Instead, it would leave
them open because many war resisters would not accept the terms of the clemency board. Instead
families would still be separated and evaders’ suffering would continue.82
Representatives of some of the mainstream churches also wrote letters encouraging the
president to issue a blanket pardon. The United Presbyterian Church in the United States of
America wrote to President Ford expressing its concerns about alternative service. It wrote that
alternative service is not an equitable solution. Many had been able to avoid serving in Vietnam
either because they were never drafted or because they found a loophole. It would be unfair, the
church argued, to punish those few who resisted or deserted when so many were able to work the
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system to their advantage. At the Presbyterian General Assembly, members had decided that
“service freely given to the nation is vastly to be preferred to labor exacted to avoid further
punishment.”83 Included with the Presbyterian Church’s letter was a document expressing its
opinions on amnesty. The document concluded,
There will be a tendency for us to want to balance the scales of justice, to compensate those
who were hurt by the war by hurting others. As two wrongs do not make a right, so we must
counter evil with good, healing the wounds of all who have been injured in this war. We
must comfort the widow and the orphan, welcome home all veterans and restore them to full
functioning in our society, and by amnesty include those with other than honorable
discharges in the reconciliation we seek.84
The church letter concluded, as CALC had, that the only way the country would start to heal was
by the president issuing a blanket pardon.
The Quakers had begun advocating for blanket amnesty for draft resisters and deserters even
before Ford took office. On March 11, 1974, Harrop A. Freeman testified before the House
Judiciary Subcommittee on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Administration of Justice. Freeman, a
professor at Cornell University, represented The Friends Committee on National Legislation. In
his testimony he expressed that throughout the 300-year-history of the Quakers, they had always
opposed war. Instead, they had promoted reconciliation between parties regardless of side.85
They, like the Presbyterians, also denounced the punishment of draft evaders and deserters when
so many were able to avoid serving in Vietnam by chance and connections. However, the
Quakers also realized that some individuals did not have these opportunities. These individuals
were often minorities, uneducated, and did not know how to work the system. In his statement,
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Freeman acknowledged the feelings of many who believed a blanket amnesty would dishonor
those who had given the ultimate sacrifice. However, Freeman quoted Louise Ransom who said,
“The only way we can dishonor those who died is to learn nothing from them.”86 Ransom’s son
was killed in Vietnam. His death sparked both Ransom and her husband to join the anti-war
movement.87
Professors of religion also wrote private letters to the president pleading their case for blanket
amnesty. Paul Deats, a professor of social ethics at Boston University School of Theology, was
one such individual. He wrote that he had preached throughout Boston and was persuaded
through discussion that general amnesty was the best course of action. After these discussions
both at school and in church he was convinced that “there is no war to assure equality of
suffering on the part of those to be granted amnesty, any more than there was equal sacrifice by
all who were in the armed forces.”88
Congressional Response
The majority of members of Congress reacted positively to the announcement of a clemency
plan. However, this feeling was not unanimous and, like the general public, some members were
staunchly against the program. Ford was not the first person to confront the amnesty question.
Throughout early 1973, several bills had been proposed in the House of Representatives that
would extend a blanket amnesty to those who had deserted or evaded the draft. These bills were
referred to committees but never made it past the discussion phase. On January 3, 1973, the War
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Resisters Exoneration Act (H.R.236) had been introduced by Rep. Bella Abzug (D-New York).
This act called for general amnesty to all who violated the law by participating in
draft evasion, draft evasion abetting, and draft card destruction; advising another to desert the
Armed Forces; deserting from the Armed Forces; missing the movement of a ship, aircraft, or
unit with which it is required in the course of duty to move; using contemptuous words
against various executive and State officials where present as a commissioned officer in the
Armed Forces; concealing or assisting any person who has deserted from the Armed Forces;
and attempting to cause insubordination by any member of the military of the United States,
with intent to interfere with the loyalty of discipline of the military of naval forces of the
United States.89
This bill would be re-introduced twice to the House of Representatives: on January 29, 1973, the
bill was reintroduced by Rep. Ronald V. Dellums (D-California), (H.R.3100).90 However, the
bill never made it to the House floor. On March 6, 1973, it was re-introduced by Rep. Bella
Abzug (H.R.5195).91 Once again, the bill died without being discussed on the House floor.
On September 17, 1974, the Bridgeport Telegram reported that President Ford’s plan had
been received well in Congress. This was true; however the article also reported many
conflicting opinions about the decision. Those supporting the plan, such as Senate Majority
Leader Mike Mansfield (D-Montana) said that the President had his “full support…it is opening
the door to a problem that has to be faced up to sometime.”92 However, there were also those in
Congress who begrudgingly accepted the plan, such as Senator James B. Allen (D-Alabama)
who was against any form of amnesty but acknowledged that it was in the President’s power to
grant amnesty. Then there were those who were against amnesty and were not afraid to denounce
the plan. Senator Barry Goldwater (R-Arizona) was a prime example. He was quoted saying that
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Ford’s Clemency Program was a “travesty [of] justice and an insult to every man who ever wore
a military uniform.”93
This division could also be seen on December 18 and 19, 1974, when the Clemency Program
came under review by the Subcommittee on Administrative Practice and Procedure of the
Committee on the Judiciary, United States Senate. The purpose of this review was to “bring
before Congress and the American people additional information about the current Clemency
Program, its record, its successes, and its failures.”94 The oppositional opening statements by
Senator Edward M. Kennedy of Massachusetts and Senator Strom Thurmond made it clear that
the moderators of the committee were not in agreement about the Clemency Program. In Senator
Kennedy’s statement, he expressed the need for national reconciliation, not only encompassing
those who evaded the draft or deserted the military, but also for veterans who did not receive a
hero’s welcome and the families of those who were killed in the conflict. Kennedy also made it
clear that he questioned “the conditional nature of the amnesty as well as its limitations on those
who would be eligible to receive it. But we [congress] welcome it as a step in the direction of
reconciliation.”95
Senator Strom Thurmond looked at the clemency board through a different lens. He wanted
those who avoided the draft or deserted the armed forces to be punished in a court of law. In the
committee report he stated that “I don’t think we provide equal protection to the citizens if we
pick out this particular class of people and say although you didn’t agree with the law when the
law required you to serve, and therefore since you didn’t agree with it you don’t have to be
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punished.”96 According to Thurmond there are many laws that people do not agree with;
however if the laws are broken then people are still penalized. The same rule, he believed, should
be applicable to those who broke the law regarding the Vietnam War. He claimed that in order to
preserve the greatest country that people are returning to, people must be willing to fight and die
for it.97
The Clemency Board Procedures
The task of determining clemency for draft evaders and deserters would be carried out by
three different organizations; The Clemency Board, The Department of Defense (DoD), and the
Department of Justice (DOJ). The first organization was The Presidential Clemency Board which
was created by President Ford when he announced the Clemency Program on September 16,
1974. The board was in charge of processing individuals who were either convicted draft evaders
or those who were undesirably discharged.98 Processing those with undesirable discharges would
be a huge undertaking. According to a memo from Lawrence Baskir, general counsel to the
board, approximately 80% of the 120,000 eligible applicants to the board were those who had
received undesirable discharges.99 There were two ways servicemembers could be issued a less
than honorable discharge. The first way this could occur by an individual being charged with an
unauthorized absence, also referred to as absent without leave (AWOL). This offense can
proceed to a court-martial and if convicted the servicemember can face both a dishonorable
discharge and up to 3 years in prison. However, the service often permitted the offender to
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choose the option of choosing to accept an administrative discharge in order to save on court and
incarceration fees.100 The second way a servicemember could receive a dishonorable discharge is
by being declared unfit by their superiors. This generally occurs if a servicemember has
committed a series of small transgressions, that leads those in charge to view them as a
disciplinary problem.101
In order to receive a clemency discharge through the Clemency Board, applicants who had
either already been convicted of draft evading or desertion had to go through a multi-step
process. The first step was to contact the board and request consideration. This could be done by
mail, phone, or through a representative such as an attorney or family member.102 After initial
contact, the clemency board would determine eligibility to apply for clemency or direct the
applicant to another branch of the Clemency Program (i.e. Department of Defense or the
Department of Justice). If the applicant was eligible, the second step involved the applicant
receiving an application form that had to be returned within 60 days. After the application was
returned, it was processed through the third step: being assigned a case number and an action
attorney. During this step, all records are compiled including prison record, military records, and
personal testimony.103 Finally, the application is sent to the clemency board. During this step the
board chose which cases would be recommended to the president for clemency. Applications
could be rejected at any point in the process.
Those members of the armed forces who had gone AWOL, deserted, or missed a unit
movement, but had not been prosecuted were to apply directly to The Department of Defense
(DoD) for clemency. In order to receive clemency through the DoD, the applicant was required
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to report to the branch of the military from which he had deserted. Those who had left the Coast
Guard were instructed to report to the Department of Transportation. After turning themselves in,
the applicant must “reaffirm his allegiance to the United States and agree to perform alternative
serve.”104 After this process, he would be given an undesirable discharge, but upon completion of
the alternative service it would be upgraded to a clemency discharge.105 Those who went AWOL
or deserted to other countries such as Canada or Sweden, would receive a fifteen-day grace
period to apply for clemency after re-entering the United States.106 Those who had dual
citizenship with another foreign country had an extra step to take before taking advantage of the
Clemency Program. They had the arduous task of proving themselves to be United States
citizens, by surrendering themselves at the border and appearing before an immigration judge. If
they surrendered at a land border then they would “not be paroled in the United States.”107 If they
surrendered at another entry point then they would be paroled in America. They could also not
be extradited “until the matter of his United States Citizenship has been resolved.”108
Draft evaders who had not been convicted were urged to apply to the Department of Justice
(DOJ). In order to gain clemency, potential applicants were required to turn themselves in to a
United States attorney, pledge allegiance to the U.S., and agree to participate in alternative
service. After completing these steps, the charges against the draft evader would be dropped and
those who had never been brought up on charges would have their cases closed.109
After applicants received clemency from the president, they were recommended to the
Director of Selective Service to receive their alternative service assignment. The only
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requirement for this assignment was that it had to “promote the national health, safety, or
interest.”110 Using the selective service system would prove to be a mistake for several reasons.
The first reason was that the organization did not want to be involved in the program. According
to Baskir and Strauss, “Many of its top officials despised the people they were supposed to
help.”111 The second reason, was that the majority of those who had deserted or evaded the draft
also despised the selective service. As a result, 90% of applicants never applied to receive their
alternative service assignments.112 The Department of Defense did not want to deal with the
hassle of prosecuting individuals. Therefore, they created a clemency loophole, which involved
the applicant signing a form promising that they would complete the requirements of the
program. The General Counsel Martin Hoffman also warned that there would be serious
consequences for anyone who committed fraud against the government.113 Despite these threats,
no one was ever prosecuted.
Participation in the Clemency Program
In December of 1974, Charles Goodell appeared before Congress to give a status report on
the Clemency Program so Congress might determine if the program was fulfilling the President’s
promise to heal the country’s wounds. The hearing would also result in Congress recommending
an extension of the program. The program was scheduled to end at the end of January 1975.
However, due to low participation, the program was extended to March 1975 by the president. In
his statement to Congress, Goodell made some startling observations about who had applied to
the Presidential Clemency Board. He revealed that the board had been surprised to find that “the
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applicants coming before us do not fit the stereotypes we had assumed.”114 Most of the
applicants who were applying to the program had gone AWOL or deserted for reasons other than
opposition to war. Goodell explains “for the most part, we have seen applicants with wives who
were about to leave them, whose fathers had died leaving a family without any means of support,
or whose mother, wife, or child had become acutely ill.”115 Due to the military’s low pay scales
(the average monthly income started at only $115 per month), a Department of Defense survey
had found that around seventy thousand military families were living below the poverty level. 116
Low income as a factor in desertion was not the only observation made by the Clemency
Board. Low education also proved to be a factor. In his statement, Goodell reported that the
applicants were not only uneducated but were “generally unsophisticated, inarticulate people.”117
This can be attributed to the fact that many who enlisted or were drafted during the Vietnam era
did not have a high school diploma.118 According to Goodell, this lack of education resulted in
applicants not knowing how to work the system. He called the applicants “unfortunate orphans
of an administrative system in which success was determined by being educated, clever,
articulate, and sophisticated, whether sincere or not.”119
Both draft evaders and deserters were very articulate as to why they disagreed and distrusted
the program. Many felt Ford’s program was not a true amnesty. Instead, it was a form of
punishment. In September 18, 1974, in a letter to the editor of The Kane Republican, Greg
Noonan expressed, “in order for me to apply for a pardon to clear my record, I [would] have to
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admit that I was wrong, and I wasn’t.”120 In the letter, Noonan continues by saying he does not
believe any of those who went to Canada would take advantage of this plan.
Those who had deserted also felt having to take an oath of allegiance was an added
punishment, as was the requirement for those living abroad. In order to apply to the program,
those who had settled in other countries such as Canada or Sweden were required to return to the
United States. Mrs. Albert C. Brunn wrote to Goodell about her son and told him her son and
“many other draft evaders do not desire to return to the United States permanently.”121 Her son
had been living underground in Canada for six years and had been recently granted Canadian
citizenship. Brunn continued by saying he “has married a Canadian girl, has a job in a very
remote, primitive area and is very happy with his life.”122
In the Subcommittee report, Senator Goodell gave reasons to explain the initial limited
participation in the Clemency Program. From the program’s creation in September of 1974 to
December 1974, only 800 out of 112,000 qualified had applied to the Clemency Board.123
According to Goodell, there were two reasons for the low participation. The first was due to a
small number of people believing they had done nothing wrong. He believed this attitude could
be attributed to those in Canada because they are “making a conscious decision about whether to
come back or not.”124 Education was another factor that was keeping potential applicants from
applying. Once again, Goodell stressed that those who qualified for the program were the “lower
educated people in the country who didn’t know how to cope.”125 Senator Kennedy responded by
asking Goodell if he believed the requirement to perform alternative service contributed to the

120

The Kane Republican, September 18, 1974.
Letter, Charles A. Miller to Charles Goodell, October 28, 1974, folder: Correspondence (2), box 2,
Charles E. Goodell Papers, Gerald R. Ford Library.
122
ibid.
123
Senate Hearing, Charles E. Goodell Papers, Gerald R. Ford Library.
124
ibid.
125
ibid.
121

32

low participation? After possibly serving a prison sentence, he asked, why would someone be
motivated to apply to the Clemency Board when they may have to serve more time performing
alternative service? Goodell did not answer the question directly instead he spoke about the
merits of having a Presidential Pardon which could provide more job opportunities or further
their education, rather than a dishonorable discharge.126
On December 19, 1974, the second day of the congressional hearing, Senator Kennedy
opened by saying “Other witnesses have stated that the low rate of participation is due to the
absence of procedural protections, to inequities and unfairness in the processing of
applicants.”127 Members of the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) were among the
witnesses to the abysmal operating procedures of the Clemency Program. According to Henry
Scwarzschild, director of the ACLU’s Project on Amnesty, the ACLU refused to offer legal
services to the Clemency Program, due to the Board’s failure to “issue rules and regulations for
its own operation and had not even made clear what the remedies and relief would be that it
might ultimately offer to applicants.”128 Scwarzschild stated that the ACLU would help any
potential applicant who sought its help, but the organization would not be officially associated
with the Board.
To combat the low participation, the Clemency Board initiated a widespread publicity
campaign to invigorate the program. In January 1975, Goodell reported to the president that the
campaign had resulted in a surge of applications. On January 6, 1975, the PR initiative was
implemented, this resulted in the number of applications tripling over a three-week period. From
September 16, 1974, to January 7, 1975, the Clemency Board had only received 953
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applications, but from January 7, to January 27, after the launch of the campaign, the board
received an additional 2,927 applications.129 Goodell explained to President Ford that the board
had implemented four initiatives to increase the number of applicants to the program. The first
was mailing over 7,000 applications directly to those who had served prison sentences for draft
offenses. Then the board began distributing public service announcements to 2,500 radio and
television stations across the country.130 Announcers would read these messages on air, as well
as broadcasting pre-recordings of the announcements by General Lew Walt.131 Father Hesburg
also produced pre-recorded announcements and traveled around the country to promote the
program.132 Simultaneously over 27,000 circulars had been distributed to “post offices,
community action agencies, unemployment insurance offices, probation officers, action
agencies, and veterans’ counselors.”133 Finally, five of the nine members of the Clemency Board
had gone on a fifteen-city press tour.
This campaign yielded incredible success and Goodell was optimistic that the trend would
continue. On February 25, 1975, Charles Goodell drafted another memo explaining to the
President that since January there had been a “tenfold increase in total applications since the
Board began its public information program in January.”134 Due to this increase Goodell asked
the President for a program extension. On February 28, 1975, President Ford extended the
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program until March 31.135 This would be the last extension of the program. However, the public
information campaign continued to work and the number of applicants was continuing to rise
when the program ended. Around 500 applicants who heard about the program too late and had
to be turned away.136
Motivations for Desertion and Evasion
People chose to either evade the draft or desert for varied and complex reasons. The
following eight cases, which were obtained from the Presidential Clemency Case files at
National Archives in College Park, Maryland, are representative of the most common reasons.
These case files provide background on the applicants, circumstances of their offenses, details of
their service in Vietnam, and any awards they may have earned. This information can be used to
determine the motivations of individuals who went AWOL or deserted.137 This section of the
thesis will be divided into three parts; conscientious objectors, those who left for financial
reasons, and those who with other motivations. The first section features four soldiers who
claimed they were conscientious objectors or who went AWOL because of dilemmas of
conscience. They range in age from 17-22 at the time of their entrance into the military and
represent four different states. Two were drafted into the army and two enlisted into the army.
The first applicant, from Milwaukee, Wisconsin, who had been drafted but failed to report
for induction, had served one year in prison. He was 22 years old when he committed his offense
and at the time of his application he had been released and was performing well as a student at
Northwestern University. In his statement to the Board, he claimed it was his roots in the
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Presbyterian Church that formed his opposition to the war. He wrote that he was “unwilling to
commit any overt or conscious acts of compliance with the system that served this dreadful
mistake.”138 This young man never filed for conscientious objector status, perhaps because he
did not have a problem with the military. He states, “I believe in the need for a military…but it
should be…voluntary.”139 Disagreeing with the concept of selective service did not qualify an
applicant for conscientious objector status. This case may fit or closely fit the idea of what a
conscientious objector might look like in the Vietnam era.
In January 1970, a 20-year-old African American from Georgia was drafted into the army.
After completing both boot camp and quartermaster training school, he was prepared to be
shipped off to Vietnam. In May 1970, while in transport to the U.S. Army Overseas Replacement
Station, he went AWOL.140 On June 13, 1972, he was apprehended by the FBI and he requested
to be discharged. He stated, “as a former Civil Rights activist, I cannot willingly be placed in a
situation where the lives of so many people will depend on me. I am not God, so I can’t say one
man must die so that another of different origin might live.”141 On September 26, 1972, he was
granted an undesirable discharge.142 This young man explained that he had a morality issue with
going to war based on his experience in the civil rights movement
As Goodell said in his statement, it is impossible to know whether claims such as these were
genuine. However, racism did play a prominent role in the experiences of soldiers in the Vietnam
era. This next applicant to the Presidential Clemency Board faced racism first hand. On
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November 24, 1967, he enlisted in the army with parental consent after dropping out of high
school in the 10th grade.143 He was well liked in the military and for over a year and a half
received both satisfactory and excellent ratings. In July of 1968, circumstances for the New York
City native began to change. The army stationed him in North Carolina at Fort Bragg where the
applicant claimed the army “violated its promise that he would get a post of his choice and it tore
up his request that he be sent to Vietnam.”144 He had difficulty adjusting to the Fort Bragg area
because “there were certain places that he could not go to and [he] received a hard time
previously at Fort Benning. He and his friends were harassed by the police.”145 The army
claimed this case was one of misunderstanding. The applicant had not submitted the correct
information which would have guaranteed his re-assignment in Vietnam. He had gone AWOL
for three days in July 1968, thirteen days in October 1968, and his last offense lasted from June
3, 1969 and ended with his capture in May of 1972.146 These three individuals deserted or went
AWOL before serving in Vietnam.
This next case involved a soldier who enlisted in the army when he was 20 years old and
served in Germany from July 17, 1964, to January 25, 1967.147 During his three years of service
the Dallas, Texas, native received excellent marks in both proficiency and conduct. He received
an honorable discharge and separated from the military. The applicant then experienced both
marital problems and six months of unemployment. He made the decision to re-enlist in the army
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to become a warrant officer.148 According the United States Army website, a warrant officer
“administers, manages, maintains, operates, and integrates Army systems and equipment across
the full spectrum of Army operations.”149
On May 21, 1968, he was appointed as a Warrant Officer One where his duties were to
“perform the primary duties of technical leader, trainer, operator, manager, maintainer, sustainer,
and advisor.”150 Then, on March 10, 1969, he received his orders to Vietnam and served for
several months as a helicopter pilot. Later in 1969, the applicant began to rethink his decision to
rejoin the military. While on a seven-day leave in Hawaii, the applicant “fully realized his
opposition to the war in Vietnam and his inability to cope with military service.”151 The brief
interaction with civilians further justified his reasoning against returning to Vietnam. While in
Hawaii, the applicant stated that he had become “depressed and disillusioned about our
continued involvement in the war and the attitude of the people towards the war.”152 Instead of
returning to duty after his leave was over, he continued to remain in the states for another six
days.
After this period of absence, he returned to his unit and requested that the army accept his
resignation. When deciding on whether to accept this resignation, the army took both the period
of AWOL and his previous service into account. After careful consideration it was decided he
should separate from the military under less than honorable conditions. The army felt “his
AWOL and subsequent attitude towards the military were treated as much more serious than
similar offenses for an enlisted man.”153 This is because they would not want his anti-military
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and anti-war attitude to influence the soldiers under his command. Before he was discharged he
had earned the National Defense Service Medal, Expert Marksman award, Good Conduct Medal,
Air Medal, Army Aviator Badge, Vietnam Campaign Medal, Vietnam Service Medal, 2 O/S
Bars, and the Vietnam Cross of Gallantry.154 These cases reveal the scope of “conscientious”
objections to service that are represented in the applications for clemency.
Conscientious objectors were not the only applicants to the Presidential Clemency Board.
There were also many who cited that they had experienced financial difficulties which led them
to believe that they did not have the option of continuing military service. The four applicants
represented here range in age from 18 to 20 years old at the time of their entrance into the
military and represent three states. Two of the applicants were in the U.S. Army and the other
two were in the Marines. All of the individuals became family breadwinners after their fathers
either deserted the family or became ill.
The first applicant was born in Georgia and enlisted in the U.S. Marines when he was 20
years old. According to his application he came from a “low-income, broken family.”155 After
moving around the country with his alcoholic father, who was in the army, his family had settled
in the Seattle, Washington, area. Soon after, his parents divorced and his mother remarried.
According to the applicant, his step-father was unreliable and “often left the family, did not
support them, and they managed poorly on welfare.”156 The applicant had enlisted in the Marines
on March 25, 1970, and earned good reports until September 1970. While he was in the military,
his step-father left permanently, leaving his mother and three sisters. The Marine attempted to be
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transferred near Seattle but was unsuccessful. His mother was receiving money from welfare;
however, she had been unable to find permanent employment. According to his statement, he
“felt a great responsibility toward assisting his mother, and acting in the capacity of father
toward his sisters.”157 On September 21, 1970, he reported that this burden of responsibility led
the applicant to go AWOL. In January 29, 1971, the applicant returned to the Marines. However,
during his absence, he began exploring religions and had converted to The Jehovah’s Witnesses.
On February 18, 1971, during this period of exploring his faith, he once again went AWOL and
took up the mantle of supporting his family. He was arrested on July 25, 1971, and was given a
personal evaluation in November of that year. This evaluation reported,
He became a Jehovah’s Witness and his attitudes about war and the service changed. He
is an admitted idealist…a young man who is probably sensitive, emotional and prone to
worry. He is intelligent and is capable of clear clinking but may be rigid and hard to
convince. Because of his religious conviction he is not felt to be restorable.158
These findings led to a special court-martial and the young man received a dishonorable
discharge. At the time of the application for clemency, the applicant had the intention to “finish
the year of high school he left uncompleted, attend college, and become a Jehovah’s Witness
Missionary.”159
The next applicant also felt responsible for providing for his family, also on welfare. This
young African American from New Jersey was nineteen when he enlisted in the Marines, he
grew up the fourth of ten children and described his life before the military as “happy, but
somewhat unstable.”160 This instability was caused by his parents’ separation when he was 13
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and growing up in a low-income family. In October 1968, he enlisted in the U.S. Marines. On
December 12, 1969, he committed his first AWOL offense. He claims he committed this offense
because, while on a fifteen-day leave at home, he “found a number of unpaid bills.”161 At this
time the family’s only source of income was a monthly $218 welfare check. On October 2, 1971,
he turned himself into the military authorities. He went back to the military because, “he felt his
presence was no longer required at home.”162 On February 3, 1972, he committed his second
AWOL offense. The applicant claimed that he had returned to service in order to obtain a
discharge. When this did not occur, he once again went AWOL. He surrendered once again on
February 22, 1972, and in his statement he claimed he needed a quick discharge because, “there
were still bills to be paid at home and the applicant’s mother had to pay a large funeral bill for
the applicant’s deceased father.”163 From February 22, 1972, until February 9, 1973, the
applicant was imprisoned.
The next applicant also had a turbulent childhood. He was born in a small Georgia town and
raised as one of nine children. His father died when he was nine years old and his mother
married his stepfather, a violent drunkard. The stepfather contributed little to no support to the
family and the applicant quit school after the tenth grade to support his family. On October 14,
1966, at the age of 18, he enlisted in the army because he thought “in the army he could best help
contribute financially to his family.”164 On March 18, 1967, after serving 5 months and 12 days,
he went AWOL for the first time. While he was in both boot camp and advanced individual
training, the situation at home had intensified. According to the applicant, “his stepfather’s
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drinking problem was causing him to become physically violent with the applicant’s younger
sisters. The father was not contributing to the support of the family and the mother was unable to
work.”165 After the soldier returned, he had been advised by a chaplain to seek a hardship
discharge. Unfortunately, he received orders for Vietnam before the discharge was processed. On
July 19, 1967, he committed his second AWOL offense. In his official statement he claimed, “he
felt that he must be in the States to protect his family from the stepfather, and because of his fear
for their safety, he intended to go home only to check on them and to return to the military.”166
On December 27, 1967, he was arrested by the local authorities. On January 5, 1968, the
applicant was confined and was not released until July 29, 1968. During that time he was courtmartialed and given a bad conduct discharge.167
This next case is an example of war changing a young man and his devotion to family. On
September 16, 1969, a young 18-year-old from West Virginia enlisted in the army with the
intention to “get it over with.”168 He had grown up near the coal mines, and according to his
mother, the applicant was “a good boy before going to Vietnam and was never in any trouble of
any kind and would give his last dime to help someone less fortunate than himself.”
On October 12, 1972, the soldier was arrested and charged with “failure to go, failure to obey,
and misconduct.”169 After being charged, he went AWOL until he was captured on October 16,
1972. This added AWOL to his long list of charges. The applicant was given an Article 15 for all
of his transgressions.170 In response, he stated “My father needs me at home so he can sign up for
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the black-lung pension bill while I support my family-my mother, sister, and brother. If forced to
stay in the army, I will continue going AWOL and be a nuisance to the army as I am needed at
home.”171
These four cases demonstrate the importance of family and the large role financial
difficulties played by desertion during the Vietnam era. The military provided help, these
programs included Red Cross assistance, various forms of hardship leave and in some cases
discharge for those who were having financial difficulties either in their own lives or at home.172
However, these programs were complicated and caused more confusion than assistance. Rather
than attempting to wade through bureaucracy, many chose to go AWOL.
The final section provides another example of why people chose to desert during the Vietnam
era. In May of 1971, this applicant, at 21, enlisted in the U.S. Marines. He was a good marine
who served a tour in Vietnam and was proud of his service. He had a reason to be proud: while
in Vietnam he received a Purple Heart, a Presidential Unit Citation, Meritorious Unit
Commendation, RVN Meritorious Unit Citation, Gallantry Cross Color; Combat Action Ribbon,
RVN Campaign medal with Device, and a VNSM with one Silver Star.173 However, while he
was back in the States on leave, his opinions began to change. He states that after he came home
“He read the papers, heard the radio, saw the TV, people protesting and just felt that people
didn’t care whether he lived or died.”174 It was especially hard for him to accept that his friends
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in Vietnam may have died in vain. On April 23, 1969, the applicant went AWOL and was not
captured until February 15, 1971.
The above cases, from the Presidential Clemency Files reveal the complex and varied reasons
that Vietnam era soldiers deserted. They show also reveal that many of those who deserted do
not fit the image of the stereotypical deserter. President Gerald Ford’s program not only served
to heal the nations wounds, but also to give an otherwise hidden glimpse into the motivations of
these young men.
Final Statistics of the Clemency Program
On September 10, 1975, President Ford amended Section 9 of Executive Order 11803, the
document that had created the Clemency Program. The new clause read, “The Board shall submit
its final recommendations to the President not later than September 15, 1975, at which time it
shall cease to exist.”175 The Clemency Board had received 15,468 applications out of 98,700
eligible participants. The Department of Defense had received 5,555 applications out of a
possible 10,115 eligible participants. Finally, the Department of Justice received 706 applications
out of a possible 4,522 eligible participants. In total 21,729 people applied to the Clemency
Program, only representing 19% of those eligible for participation.176 Goodell claimed that
despite their efforts, many members of the public did not understand the Clemency Program
while others associated the program with only helping those who had fled to Canada to avoid
service. However, those who did flee to Canada only represented 6% of civilian applicants and
2% of military applicants.177 The Clemency Program, including all three branches, had only
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7,000 Canadian exiles applications and many of these had returned to the United States before
the program was created.178
There were conflicting opinions on whether the Clemency Program could be considered a
success, even within the program itself. In a statement released by Goodell, he maintained that
the program had been a “complete success for those who participated.”179 Goodell gave four
reasons why he believed that the program could be considered successful for those who took
advantage of the Clemency Program. First, he pointed out that the president acted upon 13,133
recommendations for clemency. Of that number, 42% had received immediate pardons.180
Next, he commented on the success of the alternative service program: of those who had
been assigned to alternative service, 2,626 had begun their assignments.181 In this claim, Goodell
was optimistic about the future of the alternative service program. Only about ten percent of
those who were assigned alternative service would complete their assignments.182 Goodell’s next
argument was the public’s positive response to a Gallup Poll on how clemency discharges were
viewed. Of those polled, eighty-five percent stated they would “look upon clemency recipients
on at least an equal basis.”183 Goodell did not say whether this view was due to a favorable
opinion of the Clemency Program or if the country was in the process of moving past the war.
Goodell’s fourth and final argument for the success of the program was the 653 military
personnel who had served in combat before they deserted and, on the recommendation of the
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clemency board, were upgraded and either given full military benefits or partial benefits. 184 In
closing, Goodell expresses the need for another Clemency Program to process all of those who
were unable to meet the program’s deadline.185
This optimistic view of the outcome of the program was shared by President Ford, who
believed the program had accomplished its mission. In a statement, Ford said that a result of the
Clemency Board’s hard work, “many deserving young Americans will have been helped to
achieve full re-entry into their respective communities.”186 Ford does not mention the program’s
pitfalls or the lack of participation. According to Lawrence Baskir, this omission was because
Ford was “quite willing to let his program run its course and be forgotten.”187 Baskir also
concludes that Ford may have wanted a fair program, but he did little to ensure its success,
taking a very hands-off approach to the DoD and DOJ components. This may have been because
neither these organizations or the White House staff were interested in participating in the
program. Instead they desired a “quick and quiet program that interfered as little as possible with
their own interests.”188 Lawrence Baskir and William Strauss, both involved with the Clemency
Program, disagreed with the president and Goodell on the success of the program. Baskir had
served as general counsel and chief executive officer of the Presidential Clemency Board and
Strauss worked as director of planning and management, and editor of the Board’s final report.189
They believed the program was a failure, and not only because of low participation. They also
blamed flaws in both the design and administration of the program. It was too complex, the gains
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did not outweigh the hassle for many potential applicants, and many viewed the program as
being no better than going through the regular government channels.190
Conclusion
On September 23, 1976, the first of three presidential debates between President Ford and
Jimmy Carter took place in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. During the debate the amnesty question
was debated between the two candidates. The moderator asked whether President Ford would
reconsider his position on blanket amnesty. The president responded that the program had given
all deserters and evaders the opportunity to earn their way back into American society. He
argued that he did not think the program should go any further or expand to include a blanket
amnesty.191 Carter argued that although the Clemency Program had been successful, the only
way to truly heal the nation was to grant an unconditional pardon. He also claimed that as
president he would “bring about an end to the divisiveness that [had] occurred in our country as a
result of the Vietnam War.”192
The day after President Carter was sworn into office, he started his plan to heal the divisions
in the country. On January 21, 1977, he signed Executive Order 11967 granting a pardon to all
draft evaders.193 Any person who had been convicted of violating the Selective Service act could
apply for a certificate of pardon. However there were two stipulations to this program. The first
was that the pardon did not extend to those who deserted, those who wanted pardons for
desertion offenses had to follow standard pardon procedure. Also, those who had been charged
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with using force to resist the draft were also not covered by the executive order.194 The Ford and
Carter programs both had the goal of healing the scars left by the Vietnam War. However, both
programs were flawed and did not extend full pardons.
Historians will continue to argue whether Gerald Ford’s Presidential Clemency Board was a
success or failure, however, the applications to the program add valuable voices to the historical
record. Through their applications to the Presidential Clemency Board, almost 22,000 deserters
and evaders of the Vietnam era were able to share their individual reasons for deserting or
evading. This collection of narratives support, contradict, enlarge, and enhance our
understanding of the Vietnam War. For this reason alone, Gerald Ford’s Clemency Program can
be considered a success.
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